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Publisher: Routledge , This specific ISBN edition is currently not available. Owing to the familiarity principle, it would be unwise to expect a benevolent behavior from butchers, bakers or brewers in big cities.

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But is his solution definitive? What about the role of self-interest as ambition in the WN? In other words, self-interest understood as ambition is bad for the wealth of nations. On the other hand, humans are depicted as empirical beings acting morally on the basis of passions and the human capacities of imagination and sympathy. Thirdly, the problems and consequences of this view of man will be assessed. The first is the spectator, whose sentiments with regard to my own conduct I endeavour to enter into, by placing myself in his situation, and by considering how it would appear to me, when seen from that particular point of view.

The second is the agent, the person whom I properly call myself, and of whose conduct, under the character of a spectator, I was endeavouring to form some opinion. The first is the judge; the second the person judged of. But that the judge should, in every respect, be the same with the person judged of is as impossible, as that the cause should, in every respect, be the same with the effect TMS, p. The same process happens when the spectator needs to judge the actions of a friend or a relative: it is by detaching ourselves from our own interests and prejudices in the situation that a just, unbiased judgment can be carried out.

It is now important to see, exactly, why this division of human beings into two is problematic. In principle, the idea that humans have a dual nature is not at all new - one can go back to Plato, or Saint Augustine to find it in Western Thought. In fact, in British empiricism, of which Smith is heir, there is a strong tradition of studying people as composed of a dual nature.

Particularly, in the economic realm, John B. Davis , p. Contrary to Descartes, he did not believe in innate ideas to form the basis for knowledge, but in the association of simple ideas that come from our basic sense experience. Second, the conscience of the individual is autonomous and private. In the words of Davis , p. For Locke, individuals are confined within a first-person world, with the world of real things only available to them as intentional objects. These impressions are called ideas.

When combined, these ideas can create knowledge. Of course, mistakes may be made in the process of combining ideas. Would that also be the case with Smith? This will turn out to be problematic for Smith, in the sense that the judgments of the impartial spectator are always colored by the existing habits and customs of a given society. The previous quotation by Smith showed how our own passions and actions can be judged by the impartial spectator. But what exactly is the impartial spectator?

A few sentences later, he says that this correction is carried out under the influence of the impartial spectator. Consequently, the impartial spectator can be understood as a conscience-like subject who has the capacity to produce moral knowledge about our concrete actions. More specifically, one can consider the impartial spectator as a quasi-transcendental Kantian subject who produces moral judgments about our objective, empirical actions.

Why do we say quasi-transcendental? So, the spectator is not simply a purely transcendental, imaginary figure that floats above our empirical selves: its formation is impossible without the aid of society. Smith himself supports this view. In a famous passage, he tells us that: Were it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in some solitary place, without any communication with his own species, he could no more think of his own character, of the propriety or demerit of his own sentiments and conduct, of the beauty or deformity of his own mind, than of the beauty or deformity of his own face.

All these are objects which he cannot easily see, which naturally he does not look at, and with regard to which he is provided with no mirror which can present them to his view. Bring him into society, and he is immediately provided with the mirror which he wanted before. It is placed in the countenance and behaviour of those he lives with, which always mark when they enter into, and when they disapprove of his sentiments; and it is here that he first views the propriety and impropriety of his own passions, the beauty and deformity of his own mind This is the only looking-glass by which we can, in some measure, with the eyes of other people, scrutinize the propriety of our own conduct TMS, p.

Here, too, habit and experience have taught us to do this so easily and so readily, that we are scarce sensible that we do it ; and it requires, in this case too, some degree of reflection, and even of philosophy, to convince us, how little interest we should take in the greatest concerns of our neighbour … TMS, p.

Thus, the impartial spectator comes to life only when we live socially. Virtues are not in-born either, but socially learned. For example, according to Smith, the virtue of self-command can also be taught at school.

Adam Smith's Discourse: Canonicity, Commerce, and Conscience

Indeed, Smith says that,. There are other principles … which have a considerable influence upon the moral sentiments of mankind, and are the chief causes of the many irregular and discordant opinions which prevail in different ages and nations concerning what is blameable or praise-worthy. These principles are custom and fashion, principles which extend their dominion over our judgments concerning beauty of every kind TMS, p. Smith goes on to illustrate the enormous extent to which the judgment of beauty is influenced by habit and custom. In fact, Evensky , p. However, it can be somewhat molded, even if not to perfection TMS, p.

Another example of the interplay between the social environment and the judgment one makes is found in chapter III of Section 3 of the TMS: it is our disposition to admire, approve of and imitate the rich - even if this is degrading.

The Essential Adam Smith: Moral Sentiments

It is from our disposition to admire, and consequently to imitate, the rich and the great, that they are enabled to set, or to lead what is called the fashion. Their dress is the fashionable dress; the language of their conversation, the fashionable style; their air and deportment, the fashionable behaviour. Even their vices and follies are fashionable; and the greater part of men are proud to imitate and resemble them in the very qualities which dishonour and degrade them TMS, p. Consequently, it is possible to affirm that there is only a tendency for a passion to produce a certain behavior As a result, the relationship between motives for action passions of body and imagination and actual action cannot be said to be one of cause and effect, as in the physical sciences.

Adam Smith's discourse :canonicity, commerce, and conscience /Vivienne Brown. – National Library

If this is so, we have here an example of how the quasi-transcendental side of humans in the form of the impartial spectator can restrain the objective, empirical actions that would follow from our disposition to imitate the rich. The empirical and transcendental sides of human beings seem again as entwined. Smith of course accounts for the formation of the impartial spectator in empirical terms as a matter of social and psychological processes. Given the fact of morals, how do we account for its possibility? What Haakonssen does not show is how this dual nature of humans can generate problems between the actual actions of people and the ideal moral judgments of an impartial spectator.

We will now analyze the implications of this conception of human beings present in Smith. As we argued at the end of section 4. As Macfie and Raphael remark, the judgment of the impartial spectator can be no better than popular opinion, if the conscience of the individual is molded according to the institutions and habits of the society he lives in.

Smith tried to solve this problem by refining the theory of the impartial spectator. He introduces refinements in the second and sixth editions of the TMS. These refinements are meant to separate popular opinion which is the average opinion observed empirically in the individuals of given society and epoch from the conscience of the individual which ideally transcends all empirical determinations so as to be able to make impartial judgments :. The judgment of the real spectator depends on the desire for actual praise, that of the imagined impartial spectator on the desire for praiseworthiness.

Smith maintains the distinction in other parts of the new material added to edition 6, especially in his treatment of self-command Macfie; Raphael, , p. However, even if the desire of the impartial spectator is for praiseworthiness and not simply praise, it begs the question: what does praiseworthiness mean in different societies? It also makes us question what the final result in terms of morality is, for each different notion of praiseworthiness.

He poetically describes what happens in our psyche in such difficult situations:. In such cases, this demigod within the breast appears, like the demigods of the poets, though partly of immortal, yet partly too of mortal extraction. When his judgments are steadily and firmly directed by the sense of praise -worthiness and blame - worthiness, he seems to act suitably to his divine extraction: But when he suffers himself to be astonished and confounded by the judgments of ignorant and weak man, he discovers his connexion with mortality, and appears to act suitably, rather to the human, than the divine, part of his origin.

TMS, p. It cannot be said, however, that Smith did not try to solve this tension in the figure of the impartial spectator. In fact, it could be interesting to analyze the new section VI 14 of the TMS in light of the need to solve this tension: in this new section, Smith explains what virtues a supposedly perfectly virtuous man would have - justice, benevolence, prudence and self-command. After all, why would this section be necessary, if the impartial spectator is always right, in every society?

Maybe there was a danger of moral relativism which could lead to some actions - like the practice of killing new-born infants - being considered morally acceptable by a society that traditionally practiced it. As we have seen, Smith thinks that an action like that is not acceptable under any circumstance.

As the above quotation by MacFie and Raphael indicates, Smith spent his whole life trying to solve this problem. Forman-Barzilai , p. As a result, the moral judgment so generated may not observe actual impartial, universal standards of morality. How did they see the gap between the quasi-transcendental side and the concrete, empirical side of humans?

As MacFie and Raphael showed, however, this explanation is obviously wrong. Because the discourse of the WN was of a scientific, monological type, there was no need to make reference to the impartial spectator there. So, the gap we mentioned can be understood as an effect of different rules for producing and reading different texts: in a moral philosophical discourse, a plurality of voices is acceptable, and it is not necessary that each voice be unified into a coherent concept of individual.

The same cannot be said of a scientific discourse. His ingenious idea consisted in showing that the pervasive self-love of the WN can be approved by the impartial spectator, since in extended commercial societies self-love is the main passion one can sympathize with. This does not eliminate all other passions human beings have in other social milieus: because sympathy is stronger in small towns, families or in close neighborhoods, exchanges may also be backed by other sentiments, like benevolence, love or personal affinity.

What Otteson does not account for is the fact that the harmony of feelings between people in different forms of social organization is not enough to lead to and maintain a virtuous society. This is why the spectator can be sometimes torn between different impulses to action. In the gap between feelings-based, ideal approvals by spectators and the concrete, social consequences of these approvals, some indeterminacy as concerns the evolution of human societies appears.

The task we devoted ourselves to in this paper is to shed more light on this historical fact.

This article showed that the dual aspect of the human nature described by Smith is problematic, and paves the way to tensions between some aspects of the TMS and the WN. For example, recent books by Gintis et al. As a consequence, when designing public policies, economists should consider as their starting point not only how self-interested agents react to a set of usually monetary incentives, but also how monetary incentives can crowd in or out our moral sentiments. However, none of the aforementioned authors deal with the more philosophical implications of the problematic dual nature of human beings.

We believe so. We can perhaps only expect that a transcendental principle - like an invisible hand - may order what our minds are not equipped to order intentionally This is not a coincidence. He identifies three phases of the debate: the first phase centered on Germany, at the end of the 19th century. For a list of recent contributions, see Brown This is however not the rule in an extended market. For further information in this regard see Raphael and Macfie ; Griswold ; Otteson ; Fleischacker ; Evensky ; Raphael However, because the empirical and transcendental sides of human beings are mixed together, this is a possible interpretation of the role of the impartial spectator in concrete life.

Raphael , p. There is ample evidence in the TMS that confirms this statement, as Brown demonstrates. Adam Smith: optimist or pessimist? A new problem concerning the teleological basis of commercial society. Hants: Ashgate Publishing, History of Political Economy , v. Adam Smith, behavioral economist. Exotic preferences. New York: Oxford University Press, A cooperative species: human reciprocity and its evolution.

Princeton: Princeton University Press, Economic incentives and social preferences: substitutes or complements?