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What is their scope? One approach claims that they are valid for every ethno-nation and thereby universal. To put it more officially. The most difficult and indeed chauvinistic sub-case of particularism, i. Classical nationalism comes in both particularistic and universalistic varieties. Although the three dimensions of variation — internal strength, comparative strength, and scope — are logically independent, they are psychologically and politically intertwined. People who are radical in one respect tend also to be radical in other respects.

In other words, certain clusters of attitudes appear to be most stable, so that extreme or moderate attitudes on one dimension psychologically and politically belong with extreme or moderate ones on others. Pairing extreme attitudes on one dimension with moderate ones on the others is psychologically and socially unstable. Put starkly, the view is that morality ends at the boundaries of the nation-state; beyond there is nothing but anarchy.

The view is explicit in Friederich Meinecke , Introduction and Raymond Aron and very close to the surface in Hans Morgenthau ; for interesting links with contemporary nationalisms, see the paper by Michael C. Williams and the book edited by Duncan Bell It nicely complements the main classical nationalist claim about nation-state, i.

Let us return to our initial normative question centered around 1 attitudes and 2 actions. Is national partiality justified, and to what extent? What actions are appropriate to bring about sovereignty? In particular, are ethno-national states and institutionally protected ethno- national cultures goods independent from the individual will of their members, and how far may one go in protecting them? The philosophical debate for and against nationalism is a debate about the moral validity of its central claims. In particular the ultimate moral issue is the following: is any form of nationalism morally permissible or justified, and, if not, how bad are particular forms of it?

Selecting by Origin: Ethnic Migration in the Liberal State

For debates on partiality in general, see Chatterjee and Smith and, more recently, Feltham and Cottingham Why do nationalist claims require a defense? In some situations they seem plausible: for instance, the plight of some stateless national groups — the history of Jews and Armenians, the historical and contemporary misfortunes of Kurds — lends credence to the idea that having their own state would have solved the worst problems. Still, there are good reasons to examine nationalist claims more carefully.

The most general reason is that it should first be shown that the political form of nation state has some value as such, that a national community has a particular, or even central, moral and political value, and that claims in its favor have normative validity. Once this is established, a further defense is needed. Some classical nationalist claims appear to clash — at least under normal circumstances of contemporary life — with various values that people tend to accept.

Some of these values are considered essential to liberal-democratic societies, while others are important specifically for the flourishing of creativity and culture. The main values in the first set are individual autonomy and benevolent impartiality most prominently towards members of groups culturally different from one's own.

The alleged special duties towards one's ethno-national culture can and often do interfere with individuals' right to autonomy. Also, construed too strictly these duties can interfere with other individual rights, e. Many feminist authors have noted that the typical nationalist suggestion that women have a moral obligation to give birth to new members of the nation and to nurture them for the sake of the nation clashes with both the autonomy and the privacy of these women Yuval-Davis , Moller-Okin , and , and the discussion in the volume on Okin, Satz et al.

Another endangered value is diversity within the ethno-national community, which can also be thwarted by the homogeneity of a central national culture. Nation-oriented duties also interfere with the value of unconstrained creativity. For example, telling writers, musicians or philosophers that they have a special duty to promote national heritage interferes with the freedom of creation. The question here is not whether these individuals have the right to promote their national heritage, but whether they have a duty to do so.

Between these two sets of endangered values, the autonomy-centered and creativity-centered ones, fall values that seem to arise from ordinary needs of people living under ordinary circumstances Barry In many modern states, citizens of different ethnic background live together and very often value this kind of life.

The very fact of cohabitation seems to be a good that should be upheld. Nationalism does not tend to foster this kind of multiculturalism and pluralism, judging from both theory especially the classical nationalist one and experience. But the problems get worse. In practice, it does not seem accidental that the invidious particularistic form of nationalism, claiming rights for one's own people and denying them to others, is so widespread.

The source of the problem is the competition for scarce resources: as Ernst Gellner famously pointed out, there is too little territory for all candidate ethnic groups to have a state, and the same goes for other goods demanded by nationalists for the exclusive use of their co-nationals. According to some authors McCabe , the invidious variant is more coherent than any other form of nationalism: if one values one's own ethnic group highly the simplest way is to value it tout court. If one definitely prefers one's own culture in all respects to any foreign one, it is a waste of time and attention to bother about others.

The universalist, non-invidious variant introduces enormous psychological and political complications. These arise from a tension between spontaneous attachment to one's own community and the demand to regard all communities with an equal eye. This tension might make the humane, non-invidious position psychologically unstable, difficult to uphold in situations of conflict and crisis, and politically less efficient.

Philosophers sympathetic to nationalism are aware of the evils that historical nationalism has produced and usually distance themselves from these. In order to help the reader find his or her way through this involved debate, we shall briefly summarize the considerations which are open to the ethno-nationalist to defend his or her case.

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Compare the useful overview in Lichtenberg Further lines of thought built upon these considerations can be used to defend very different varieties of nationalism, from radical to very moderate ones. It is important to offer a warning concerning the key assumptions and premises figuring in each of the lines of thought summarized below: namely, that the assumptions often live an independent life in the philosophical literature. Some of them figure in the proposed defenses of various traditional views which have little to do with the concept of a nation in particular.

For brevity, I shall reduce each line of thought to a brief argument; the actual debate is more involved than one can represent in a sketch. I shall indicate, in brackets, some prominent lines of criticism that have been put forward in the debate. These are discussed in greater detail in Miscevic The main arguments in favor of nationalism purporting to establish its fundamental claims about state and culture will be divided into two sets.

The first set of arguments defends the claim that national communities have a high value, often seen as non-instrumental and independent of the wishes and choices of their individual members, and argues that they should therefore be protected by means of state and official statist policies. The first set will be presented here in more detail, since it has formed the core of the debate. It depicts the community as the deep source of value or as the unique transmission device connecting its members to some important values.

Here is a characterization. The general form of deep communitarian arguments is as follows. First, the communitarian premise: there is some uncontroversial good e. Then comes the claim that the ethno-cultural nation is the kind of community ideally suited for this task. Unfortunately, this crucial claim is rarely defended in detail in the literature.

But here is a sample from Margalit, whose last sentence has been already quoted above:. Then follows the statist conclusion: in order for such a community to preserve its own identity and support the identity of its members, it has to assume always or at least normally the political form of a state. The conclusion of this type of argument is that the ethno-national community has the right to an ethno-national state and the citizens of the state have the right and obligation to favor their own ethnic culture in relation to any other.

Although the deeper philosophical assumptions in the arguments stem from the communitarian tradition, weakened forms have also been proposed by more liberal philosophers. The original communitarian lines of thought in favor of nationalism suggest that there is some value in preserving ethno-national cultural traditions, in feelings of belonging to a common nation, and in solidarity between a nation's members.

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A liberal nationalist might claim that these are not the central values of political life but are values nevertheless. Moreover, the diametrically opposing views, pure individualism and cosmopolitanism, do seem arid, abstract, and unmotivated by comparison.

By cosmopolitanism I shall understand a moral and political doctrine of the following sort:. Critics of cosmopolitanism sometimes argue that these two claims are incoherent, since human beings generally strive best under some global institutional arrangement like ours that concentrates power and authority at the level of states.

Confronted with opposing forces of nationalism and cosmopolitanism, many philosophers opt for a mixture of liberalism-cosmopolitanism and patriotism-nationalism. In his writings B. Hilary Putnam proposes loyalty to what is best in the multiple traditions in which each of us participates, apparently a middle way between a narrow-minded patriotism and an overly abstract cosmopolitanism ibid , The compromise has been foreshadowed by Berlin , and Taylor , and its various versions worked out in considerable detail by authors such as Yael Tamir , David Miller , , , Kai Nielsen , Michel Seymour and Chaim Gans See also the debate around Miller's work in De Schutter and Tinnevelt In the last two decades it has occupied center stage in the debate and even provoked re-readings of historical nationalism in its light, for instance in Miller a , Sung Ho Kim or Brian Vick Most liberal nationalist authors accept various weakened versions of the arguments we list below, taking them to support moderate or ultra-moderate nationalist claims.

It is important to mention here a more utopian proposal due to Chandran Kukathas , which nicely combines multicultural pluralism with the distinctiveness of particular communities that classical nationalism celebrates. Some of these individual islands might be quite unpleasant by liberal standards; what makes the archipelago liberal overall is that each community guarantees its dissenting members the right to exit which might have a high price, if former members have nowhere to go with any prospect for a decent life.

The first level of political organization might thus be non-liberal Kukathas hopes it will not turn out to be so , while the second level would be strongly liberal. The proposal nicely combines the traditional features of classical nationalism with very liberal, almost anarchic traits of the whole. Unfortunately, it is hard to see what would keep such an archipelago together without a strong unifying state, which Kukathas would not have. A clear danger is a slide towards a multipolar achipelago, with some big and powerful islands say, a huge Islamic island, a huge EU-type island, and so on.

Let me return to the main line of exposition. Here are the main weakenings of classical ethno-nationalism that liberal, limited-liberal and cosmopolitan nationalists propose. First, ethno-national claims have only prima facie strength, and cannot trump individual rights. Second, legitimate ethno-national claims do not in themselves automatically amount to the right to a state, but rather to the right to a certain level of cultural autonomy.

The main models of autonomy are either territorial or non-territorial: the first involves territorial devolution; the second, cultural autonomy granted to individuals regardless of their domicile within the state. Third, ethno-nationalism is subordinate to civic patriotism, which has little or nothing to do with ethnic criteria.

Finally, any legitimacy that ethno-national claims may have is to be derived from choices the concerned individuals are free to make. Consider now the particular arguments from the first set. The first argument depends on assumptions that also appear in the subsequent ones, but it further ascribes to the community an intrinsic value.

The later arguments point more towards an instrumental value of nation, derived from the value of individual flourishing, moral understanding, firm identity and the like. Each ethno-national community is valuable in and of itself since it is only within the natural encompassing framework of various cultural traditions that important meanings and values are produced and transmitted.

The members of such communities share a special cultural proximity to each other. By speaking the same language and sharing customs and traditions, the members of these communities are typically closer to one another in various ways than they are to those who don't share the same culture. The community thereby becomes a network of morally connected agents, i.

A prominent obligation of each individual concerns the underlying traits of the ethnic community, above all language and customs: they ought to be cherished, protected, preserved and reinforced. The general assumption that moral obligations increase with cultural proximity is often criticized as problematic. Moreover, even if we grant this general assumption in theory, it breaks down in practice. Nationalist activism is most often turned against close and substantially similar neighbors rather than against distant strangers, so that in many important contexts the appeal to proximity will not work.

It might, however, retain its potential force against culturally distant groups. The ethno-national community is essential for each of its members to flourish. In particular, it is only within such a community that an individual can acquire concepts and values crucial for understanding the community's cultural life in general and the individual's own life in particular. There has been much debate on the pro-nationalist side about whether divergence of values is essential for separateness of national groups.

Taylor , concluded that it is not separateness of value that matters. Critics of nationalism point out that flourishing might have too high a price, especially in the form of aggressiveness towards neighbors. Communitarian philosophers emphasize nurture over nature as the principal force determining our identity as people — we come to be who we are because of the social settings and contexts in which we mature. This claim certainly has some plausibility. For example, Nielsen writes:. Given that an individual's morality depends upon their having a mature and stable personal identity, the communal conditions that foster the development of personal identity must be preserved and encouraged.

For the opposite line, denying the importance of fixed and homogenous identity and proposing hybrid identities, see the papers in Iyall Smith and Leavy Philosophical nationalists claim that the nation is the right format for preserving and encouraging such identity-providing communities. Therefore, communal life should be organized around particular national cultures.

The classical nationalist proposes that cultures should be given their own states, while the liberal nationalist proposes that cultures should get at least some form of political protection. A particularly important variety of value is moral value. Some values are universal, e. The nation offers a natural framework for moral traditions, and thereby for moral understanding; it is the primary school of morals. I note in fairness that Taylor himself is ambivalent about the national format of morality. An often-noticed problem with this line of thought is that particular nations do not each have a special morality of their own.

Each national culture contributes uniquely to the diversity of human cultures. The most famous twentieth century proponent of the idea, Isaiah Berlin interpreting Herder, who first saw this idea as significant , writes:. The carrier of basic value is thus the totality of cultures, from which each national culture and style of life that contributes to the totality derives its own value.

The argument from diversity is therefore pluralistic: it ascribes value to each particular culture from the viewpoint of the collective totality of cultures. Assuming that the ethno- nation is the natural unit of culture, the preservation of cultural diversity amounts to institutionally protecting the purity of ethno- national culture. A pragmatic inconsistency might threaten this argument. The issue is who can legitimately propose ethno-national diversity as ideal: the nationalist is much too tied to his or her own culture to do it, while the cosmopolitan is too eager to preserve intercultural links that go beyond the idea of having a single nation-state.

Moreover, is diversity a value such that it deserves to be protected whenever it exists? Should the protection of diversity be restricted to certain aspects of culture s proposed in full generality? The line of thought 1 is not individualistic. And 5 can be presented without reference to individuals: diversity may be good in its own right, or may be good for nations. But the other lines of thought in the set just presented are all linked to the importance of community life in relation to the individual.

In each argument, there is a general communitarian premise a community, to which one has no choice whether or not to belong, is crucial for one's identity, or for flourishing or some other important good. This premise is coupled with the more narrow, nation-centered descriptive claim that the ethno-nation is precisely the kind of community ideally suited for the task. However, liberal nationalists do not find these arguments completely persuasive.

In their view, the premises of the arguments may not support the full package of nationalist ambitions and may not be unconditionally valid. For an even more skeptical view stemming from social science, see Hale Still, there is a lot to these arguments, and they might support liberal nationalism and a more modest stance in favor of national cultures. We conclude this sub-section by pointing to an interesting and sophisticated pro-national stance that developed by David Miller over the course of decades, from his work of to the most recent work of He accepts multicultural diversity within a society but stresses an overarching national identity, taking as his prime example British national identity, which encompasses the English, Scottish and other ethnic identities.

Such identity is necessary for basic social solidarity, and it goes far beyond simple constitutional patriotism, Miller claims. A skeptic could note the following. However, multi-cultural states typically bring together groups with very different histories, languages, religions, even quite contrasting appearances. One seems to have a dilemma. Grounding social solidarity in national identity requires the latter to be rather thin and seems likely to end up as full-on, unitary cultural identity.

Thick constitutional patriotism may be the only possible attitude that can ground such solidarity while preserving the original cultural diversity. Arguments in the second set concern political justice and do not rely on metaphysical claims about identity, flourishing and cultural values. They appeal to actual or alleged circumstances that would make nationalist policies reasonable or permissible or even mandatory , such as a the fact that a large part of the world is organized into nation states so that each new group aspiring to create a nation-state just follows an established pattern , or b the circumstances of group self-defense or of redressing past injustice that might justify nationalist policies to take a special case.

Some of the arguments also present nationhood as conducive to important political goods, such as equality. A group of people of a sufficient size has a prima facie right to govern itself and decide its future membership, if the members of the group so wish. It is fundamentally the democratic will of the members themselves that grounds the right to an ethno-national state and to ethno-centric cultural institutions and practices. This argument presents the justification of ethno- national claims as deriving from the will of the members of the nation.

It is therefore highly suitable for liberal nationalism but not appealing to a deep communitarian who sees the demands of the nation as independent from, and prior to, the choices of particular individuals. For extended discussion of this argument, see Buchanan , which has become a contemporary classic; Moore ; and Gans For some exchanges of arguments, see J. An interesting volume from a legal perspective is Kohen , and some interesting case studies are presented in Casertano For an extremely negative judgment see Yack , Ch.

Oppression and injustice give the victimized group a just cause and the right to secede. If a minority group is oppressed by the majority to the extent that almost every minority member is worse off than most members of the majority simply in virtue of belonging to the minority, then nationalist claims on behalf of the minority are morally plausible and potentially compelling. This argument implies a restrictive answer to our questions 2b and 2c : the use of force in order to achieve sovereignty is legitimate only in the cases of self-defense and redress. Of course, there is a whole lot of work to be done specifying against whom force may legitimately be used, and how much damage may be done to how many.

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It establishes a typical remedial right, acceptable from a liberal standpoint. See the discussion in Kukathas and Poole , also Buchanan For past injustices see Waldron Members of a minority group are often disadvantaged in relation to a dominant culture because they have to rely on those with the same language and culture to conduct the affairs of daily life. Since freedom to conduct one's daily life is a primary good, and it is difficult to change or give up reliance upon one's minority culture to attain that good, this reliance can lead to certain inequalities if special measures are not taken.

Spontaneous nation-building by the majority has to be moderated. Therefore, liberal neutrality itself requires that the majority provide certain basic cultural goods, i. See Kymlicka b, and Institutional protections and the right to the minority group's own institutional structure are remedies that restore equality and turn the resulting nation-state into a more moderate multicultural one.

See Kymlicka , We note an interesting recent proposal by Robert E. Goodin , who distinguishes two motivations for multiculturalism and two possible resultant kinds: polyglot multiculturalism and protective multiculturalism. The nation-state has in the past succeeded in promoting equality and democracy. Liberalism informs the notion of individual agency, but provides weak purchase at best on membership and on the collective cohesion and capacity of the demos.

Ethno-national solidarity is a powerful motive for a more egalitarian distribution of goods Miller , Canovan , The nation-state also seems to be essential to safeguard the moral life of communities in the future, since it is the only form of political institution capable of protecting communities from the threats of globalization and assimilationism. For a detailed critical discussion of this argument see Mason Calhoun himself is acutely aware of the limitations of his praise of nationalism, mentioning some on the same page as that from which we quoted above.

Roshwald in his book, which cited the paradoxical and contradictory nature of nationalist claims. To quote a fine summary given by A. Greenfeld herself is very critical of nationalism, but someone might contemplate incorporating her theory cleansed of her critical attitude into a defense of nationalism. These political arguments can be combined with deep communitarian ones. The idea of moderate nation-building points to an open multi-culturalism, in which every group receives its share of remedial rights but, instead of walling itself off from others, participates in a common, overlapping civic culture and in open communication with other sub-communities.

Given the variety of pluralistic societies and intensity of trans-national interactions, such openness seems to many to be the only guarantee of stable social and political life see the debate in Shapiro and Kymlicka The only solution seems to be extreme moderation. The dialectics of moderating nationalist claims in the context of pluralistic societies might thus lead to a stance respectful of cultural differences, but liberal and potentially cosmopolitan in its ultimate goals.

The liberal nationalist stance is mild and civil, and there is much to be said in favor of it. It tries to reconcile our intuitions in favor of some sort of political protection of cultural communities with a liberal political morality. Of course, this raises issues of compatibility between liberal universal principles and the particular attachments to one's ethno-cultural nation.

Very liberal nationalists such as Tamir divorce ethno-cultural nationhood from statehood. Also, the kind of love for country they suggest is tempered by all kinds of universalist considerations, which in the last instance trump national interest Tamir , ; see also Moore and Gans There is an ongoing debate among philosophical nationalists about how much weakening and compromising is still compatible with a stance's being nationalist at all.

For example, Canovan ch. For a more sociological approach to the dialectic of the global and the ethno-national, see the Introduction to Delanty and Kumar and Delanty's contribution to that volume. In recent years issues of nationalism have been increasingly integrated into the debate about the international order see the entries on globalization and cosmopolitanism. The main conceptual link is the claim that nation-states are natural, stable and suitable units of the international order. A related debate concerns the role of minorities in the processes of globalization see Kaldor, Moreover, the two approaches might ultimately converge: a multiculturalist liberal nationalism and a moderate, difference-respecting cosmopolitanism have a lot in common.

One investigation in this direction has been undertaken by Kok-Chor Tan , see in particular ch. However, he is quite skeptical about the convergence in his later paper see also his book. Let me start by briefly returning to the recent debates on territory and nation and then pass to issues of global justice.

She nevertheless stresses that more than one ethnic group can have formative ties to a given territory, and that there might be competing claims based on settlement.


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Yack , ff starts from the same point to derive much more pessimistic conclusions. But, given the ethno-national conflicts of the twentieth century, one can safely assume that culturally plural states divided into isolated and closed sub-communities glued together merely by arrangements of modus vivendi are inherently unstable.

Stability might therefore require that the pluralist society envisioned by liberal culturalists promote quite intense intra-state interaction between cultural groups in order to forestall mistrust, reduce prejudice, and create a solid basis for cohabitation. On the opposite end of the spectrum, more cosmopolitan authors Buchanan , Waldron , Other Internet Resources also point to the fact of multiple settlements in roughly the same territory and to the importance of the proximity of various ethno-cultural groups. They stress internal cultural pluralism: for reasons of peace and security, state borders should bring together distinct cultural groups typically ethno-national ones , and they in fact most often do so.

Combining the cultural motivation to foster open multiculturalism and Waldron's security-based motivation to structure states for the purpose of resolving conflicts and establishing justice, forming a state becomes a duty we owe to anyone with whom we are likely to come into endemic conflict. Waldron , Other Internet Resources. But where should one stop? The question arises since there are a lot of geographically open, interacting territories of various sizes. The cosmopolitan logic regarding the interests of peace and security therefore suggests joining together bigger and bigger units in a kind of recursive scheme.

For instance, the EU was created to secure lasting peace, and other supra-statal and macro-regional might follow its lead. Ultimately, the combination of ethno-cultural and security-focused considerations might thus point in a clearly cosmopolitan direction when formulating and resolving dilemmas about matters of territory.

This brings us to the wider issue concerning cosmopolitanism. What are the obligations of nations and nation-states towards neighbors, and even more distant Others? This issue is regaining prominence in recent debates on nationalism. Again, see the entries on globalization and cosmopolitanism.

Since the present entry is on nationalism, we stress the pro-national accounts, taking Miller , as our paradigm. In principle one might think of intermediate positions falling between two extremes: on one extreme, completely closed nation-states, like in Fichte's early nineteenth century utopia of Closed commercial state ; on the other, completely opened borders, like in the arrangement proposed by Joseph Carens However, the tough nationalistic line is no longer proposed seriously in ethical debates, so the furthest pro-national extreme is in fact a relatively moderate stance, exemplified by Miller in the works listed.

Here is a typical proposal of his concerning global justice based on nation states:. A similar proposal might work for the reduction of the emission of greenhouse gasses, he continues. It is a challenging idea, and a critic might ask how it would fare under normal circumstances. Imagine the proposal is accepted by leading industrial countries, and each chooses its beneficiaries.

Suppose a benefactor state B1 adopts a beneficiary state C1 and proceeds to deliver aid. What if a political faction in C1 that is hostile to B1 pushes its co-nationals to turn to some other benefactor? Similarly, if B1 needed international support in its dealings with some other powerful country B2, it would certainly count on C1 to give it. This arrangement is beginning to look somewhat colonial.

Even worse things might happen in a situation of economic crisis: if B1 has been feeding C1 for ten years, during a crisis it might become greedy for C1's resources; what would prevent it from blackmailing C1? So much for issues of aid. On the opposite extreme one finds strong cosmopolitans, like Thomas Pogge, who blame the global order for injustices committed against the poor and recommend a considerable redistribution of goods as a remedy to restore justice.

In between we find authors like Mathias Risse , who proposes a highly structured conception of justice that preserves the statist order of international politics but accepts common ownership of the Earth and places considerable duties on states: inequalities are allowed, but only if all inhabitants of the Earth have enough to satisfy their basic needs. Miller has also put forward the most thoughtful pro-nationalist proposal concerning immigration. His proposal allows refugees to seek asylum temporarily until the situation in their country of origin improves; it also limits economic migration.

Miller argues against the defensibility of a global standard for equality, opportunity, welfare, etc. As mentioned, the opposite extreme is occupied by those like Joseph Carens who defend completely open borders. Many recent views seem to converge to the middle ground.

Christiano, for example, proposes working from the relatively just system of existing norms that oblige cooperation between states. He thinks that the right way to proceed is to negotiate consensus agreements satisfying individual beneficiary and benefactor states as well as international legal norms. A poor state might send a number of workers to a rich state on a temporary basis; these workers would then return to their country of origin to foster development.

International law would provide a framework of legitimacy, and negotiations between states would provide concrete, and hopefully just, solutions. The philosophy of nationalism nowadays does not concern itself much with the aggressive and dangerous form of invidious nationalism that often occupies center stage in the news and in sociological research. Although this pernicious form can be of significant instrumental value in mobilizing oppressed people and restoring their sense of dignity, its moral costs are usually taken by philosophers to outweigh its benefits.

Nationalist philosophers distance themselves from such aggressive forms of nationalism and mainly seek to construct and defend very moderate versions; these have therefore come to be the main focus of recent philosophical debate. The debate carries an interesting methodological message overlooked in the literature. Authors defending the importance of ethno-national and cultural considerations standardly point to their enormous practical impact, and underlying factual, social and historical factors.

It is no wonder that the prominent pro-nationalist thinker D. Miller insists on the importance of social and historical facts for political philosophy and moral decisions , chapters 1 and 2. Indeed, when drawing from the usual resources for theorizing in political philosophy — principles, facts including presumed facts , and intuitions from thought experiments — cosmopolitan authors typically stress the importance of principles, while pro-nationalists stress that of facts.

In presenting the claims that nationalists defend, we have proceeded from the more radical towards more liberal nationalist alternatives. In examining the arguments for these claims, we have presented metaphysically demanding communitarian arguments resting upon deep communitarian assumptions about culture, such as the premise that the ethno-cultural nation is the most important community for all individuals.

This is an interesting and respectable claim, but its plausibility has not yet been established. The moral debate about nationalism has resulted in various weakenings of culture-based arguments, proposed by liberal nationalists, which render the arguments less ambitious but much more plausible. Having abandoned the old nationalist ideal of a state owned by a single dominant ethno-cultural group, liberal nationalists have become receptive to the idea that identification with a plurality of cultures and communities is important for a person's social identity.

They have equally become sensitive to trans-national issues and more willing to embrace a partly cosmopolitan perspective. Liberal nationalism has also brought to the fore more modest, less philosophically or metaphysically charged arguments grounded in concerns about justice. Liberal culturalists such as Kymlicka have proposed minimal and pluralistic versions of nationalism built around such arguments.

In these minimal versions, the project of building classical nation-states is tempered or abandoned and replaced by a more sensitive form of national identity that can thrive in a multicultural society. This new project, however, might demand a further widening of our moral perspectives.

The twentieth century has taught us that culturally-plural states divided into isolated and closed sub-communities glued together only by arrangements of mere modus vivendi are inherently unstable. Stability might therefore require that the plural society envisioned by liberal culturalists promote quite intense interaction between cultural groups in order to forestall mistrust, reduce prejudice and create a solid basis for cohabitation. On the other hand, as noted above in connection with issues of territorial justice, once membership in multiple cultures and communities is legitimized, social groups will spread beyond the borders of a single state e.

The internal dialectic driven by concern for ethno-cultural identity might in this way lead to pluralistic and potentially cosmopolitan political arrangements that are rather distant from what was classically understood as nationalism. This is a short list of books on nationalism that are readable and useful introductions to the literature. First, two contemporary classics of social science with opposing views are:. The two best recent anthologies of high-quality philosophical papers on the morality of nationalism are:.

Interesting critical analyses of group solidarity in general and nationalism in particular, written in the traditions of rational choice theory and motivation analysis, are:. There is a wide offering of interesting sociological and political science work on nationalism, which is beginning to be summarized in:. The most readable short anthology of brief papers for and against cosmopolitanism and nationalism by leading authors in the field is:.

What is a Nation? Varieties of Nationalism 2. The Moral Debate 3. First, the descriptive ones: 1a What is a nation and what is national identity? Second, the normative ones: 1e Is the attitude of caring about national identity always appropriate? They raise an important issue: 2a Does political sovereignty within or over a territory require statehood or something weaker?

Once this has been discussed, we can turn to the related normative issues: 2b What actions are morally permitted to achieve sovereignty and to maintain it? Let me characterize these briefly: Nationalism in a wider sense is any complex of attitudes, claims and directives for action ascribing a fundamental political, moral and cultural value to nation and nationality and deriving obligations for individual members of the nation, and for any involved third parties, individual or collective from this ascribed value.

The philosophically most important variations concern three aspects of such normative claims: i The normative nature and strength of the claim: does it promote merely a right say, to have and maintain a form of political self-government, preferably and typically a state, or have cultural life centered upon a recognizably ethno-national culture , or a moral obligation to get and maintain one , or a moral, legal and political obligation?

To put it more officially Universalizing nationalism is the political program that claims that every ethno-nation should have a state that it should rightfully own and the interests of which it should promote. The deep communitarian perspective is a theoretical perspective on political issues in the case under consideration, on nationalism that justifies a given political arrangement here, a nation-state by appeal to deep philosophical assumptions about human nature, language, community ties and identity in a deeper, philosophical sense.

But here is a sample from Margalit, whose last sentence has been already quoted above: The idea is that people make use of different styles to express their humanity. The styles are generally determined by the communities to which they belong. By cosmopolitanism I shall understand a moral and political doctrine of the following sort: Cosmopolitanism is the view that one's primary moral obligations are directed to all human beings regardless of geographical or cultural distance , and political arrangements should faithfully reflect this universal moral obligation in the form of supra-statist arrangements that take precedence over nation-states.

For example, Nielsen writes: We are, to put it crudely, lost if we cannot identify ourselves with some part of an objective social reality: a nation, though not necessarily a state, with its distinctive traditions. What we find in people — and as deeply embedded as the need to develop their talents — is the need not only to be able to say what they can do but to say who they are.

This is found, not created, and is found in the identification with others in a shared culture based on nationality or race or religion or some slice or amalgam thereof…. Under modern conditions, this securing and nourishing of a national consciousness can only be achieved with a nation-state that corresponds to that national consciousness , We are forbidden to make judgments of comparative value, for that is measuring the incommensurable. Smith: For Roshwald, nationalism is at once ancient and very modern; it employs twin conceptions of time, cyclical and linear; it seeks self-determination while manifesting a sense of victimhood; it insists on the nation's particularity of chosenness while claiming a universal mission; and finally, it reveals a symbiosis of kindred and mingled blood, of ethnic and civic nationhood.

Through these antinomies, nationalism is constantly able to renew itself and adapt to different situations …. Here is a typical proposal of his concerning global justice based on nation states: It might become a matter of national pride to have set aside a certain percentage of GDP for developmental goals — perhaps for projects in one particular country or group of countries …. Conclusion The philosophy of nationalism nowadays does not concern itself much with the aggressive and dangerous form of invidious nationalism that often occupies center stage in the news and in sociological research.

Bibliography The Beginner's Guide to the Literature This is a short list of books on nationalism that are readable and useful introductions to the literature. First, two contemporary classics of social science with opposing views are: Gellner, E. Smith, A. Spencer, P. The two best recent anthologies of high-quality philosophical papers on the morality of nationalism are: McKim, R. Couture, J.

The debate continues in: Miscevic, N. Philosophical Perspectives. La Salle and Chicago: Open Court. Dieckoff, A. Primoratz, I. Breen, K. A good brief sociological introduction to nationalism in general is: Crosby, S. Hogan, J. The best general introduction to the communitarian-individualist debate is still: Avineri, Shlomo and de-Shalit, Avner eds. For a non-nationalist defense of culturalist claims see: Kymlicka, W. Three very readable philosophical defenses of very moderate nationalism are: Miller, D. Tamir, Y. Gans, C. A polemical, witty and thoughtful critique is offered in: Barry, B.

Interesting critical analyses of group solidarity in general and nationalism in particular, written in the traditions of rational choice theory and motivation analysis, are: Hardin, R. Yack, B. There is a wide offering of interesting sociological and political science work on nationalism, which is beginning to be summarized in: Motyl, A.

A recent encyclopedic overview is: Herb, G. It will also help us avoid mistakes of the past. The first immigrants to come to the United States arrived voluntarily from Europe during the Colonial period. Many were merchants looking to trade and barter or settlers in search of religious toleration.

The History of Immigration Policies in the U.S. - NETWORK Lobby

When they reached North America, also known as the New World, they encountered groups of indigenous people who welcomed them. Other groups of immigrants arrived involuntarily. English convicts were sent over as they were not wanted in their own country and, beginning in , African slaves were forcefully transported over as part of the slave trade.

Slaves, without rights, were commonly wanted for cheap labor but convicts were a nuisance to the Colonies. The act of dumping English convicts led to the first passage of immigration enforcement legislation. The Colonies fought against the English Parliamentary Law that allowed criminals to be sent over and passed their own laws against that practice.

Ironically these laws were passed by recent descendants of criminals that had been sent over previously.


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At the time the population was a combination of Europeans of all different nations and languages, Native Americans and African slaves. However, neither Native Americans the original founders nor African Slaves were even considered citizens. It was a question of whether the United States was a country of one specific group; White, Anglo-Saxon and Protestant men and women or one that welcomed newcomers from different countries, different religions and who spoke different languages.

Difference of opinion on this point created the first political party, the Federalists. They feared them coming to the United States and causing a political disturbance. Their fear convinced Congress to pass a stricter Naturalization law in Immigrants were required to be a resident for 2 to 5 years to be considered a citizen. These laws allowed the President to deport any immigrant who he believed posed a threat to national security, all out of fear. In , the new Democratic Party under Thomas Jefferson, took power and eliminated the Alien and Sedition Acts deeming them as unconstitutional and as violations of the First and Tenth Amendment.

Furthermore the Jefferson administration moved the citizenship requirement back to five years of permanent residence where it is today. During the 19th century a large wave of Europeans immigrated to the United States. Conditions in other countries push factors caused many immigrants to leave their home country and specific conditions in the United States made those immigrants choose to immigrate here pull factors. Several of the first European immigrants were Irish and German.

The potato famine in Ireland and the loss of land from the British pushed the Irish to immigrate to other countries. Likewise, Germany was under severe economic depression and religious intolerance that forced many Catholics to leave. The flow of European immigrants was beneficial to the quickly changing economy in the United States.

Immigrants chose the United States for several reasons but two pull factors played a major role. First, rapid industrialization increased the need for cheap labor. Second, the United States was beginning to claim land from the Spanish and native people in the western half of North America. However, the large influx of immigrants frightened certain groups of people.

In particular they wanted to ban Catholic immigration. In order to ease the tension between the requests of anti-immigrant groups and the government, in Congress passed an exclusion law banning prostitutes and convicts from entering the United States ending a more open immigration policy. Between and another wave of European immigrants entered the United States. Many came from Russia, Austria and Italy and a large portion of this new group were Jewish. Although immigrant labor continued to be needed, there were strong anti-immigrant feelings toward this new growing population.

Congress decided that immigrants should be required to pass a medical exam and have no criminal record in order to immigrate to the United States. The Act barred people having any contagious diseases or history of crime. In , people in the United States were also fearful of European radicals entering the country and so the government added anarchists and subversives to the Act.

Fear was so widespread that Congress and President Theodore Roosevelt decided to establish the Dillingham Commission to report the effects of immigration on the country. The results concluded that the United States was not benefiting from immigration because the immigrants were inferior to United States citizens. The Commission recommended that the United States no longer accept immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe and furthermore all immigrants were to pass a literacy test.

In , under the Wilson administration, Congress passed the first comprehensive immigration act which included a literacy test requirement. In the National Origins Act was passed putting a quota system on the number of immigrants who entered the United States. The law effectively stopped anymore large flows of European immigration. Similar to the start of European immigration, the Chinese started immigrating to the United States after a population explosion and a food shortage in China. Other push factors were the Opium War and the Taiping rebellion. While in the United States the Chinese endured constantly changing U.

When immigrants could be used for cheap labor they were instantly recruited and embraced but the second an economic shift took place in the United States, immigrants were given the cold shoulder. Initially, United States businesses recruited Chinese men to work as day laborers.

The idea was that they would come and work temporarily, save money and return back to their families in China. California in particular was supportive of Chinese immigration and lured a lot of immigrants to settle in the western half of the country. However, priorities shifted when gold was discovered in California mines in Several mines banned Chinese immigrants from mining.

After the Civil War the Chinese were recruited again to build levees and the railroad. They remained in the United States and entered the service industry instead. The welcoming of Chinese immigrants stopped abruptly as fear grew that they were taking over jobs and a threat to society. Several laws were passed to exclude them from society. In the first of three Chinese Exclusion Acts was passed, banning more Chinese immigration. The Mexicans in these areas had an option to return to Mexico or stay living in what was newly considered the United States.

Most did not return and the United States did not enforce any border laws. The lack of structure caused a culture to develop along the border. People would work in one country and live in another. The United States did not seem to be concerned with this issue as they were not included in the quota system of the National Origins Act of Between and , Mexican immigration into the United States rose dramatically as cheap U.

Employers recruited Mexicans to work in agriculture after Chinese and Japanese immigrants were excluded from working in the United States. However Mexican workers were at a great disadvantage as they had no working rights.