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  • For one thing, you may not properly ignore a possibility which your conversational partner is right now calling to your attention. So when the sceptic draws your attention to some far-fetched possibility of error, he thereby destroys your knowledge—but only temporarily. Contextualists commonly attempt to solve the skeptical puzzle by claiming that the skeptic tacitly raises the standards for knowledge.

    The plausibility of her argument results not from her raising the standards for knowledge, but rather from her constricting what can count as evidence.

    Contextualism in Epistemology-A Bibliography

    She does this by unwittingly exploiting the context-sensitivity of our attributions of evidence. It is suggested by its proponents that contextualism the view that the truth conditions of knowledge-attributing sentences vary with the context in which they are uttered provides the best overall way of accommodating the manifest flexibility in our willingness to attribute knowledge and of solving certain sceptical puzzles.

    Jason Stanley presents a startling and provocative claim about knowledge: that whether or not someone knows a proposition at a given time is in part determined by his or her practical interests. Whether a true belief is knowledge is not merely a matter of supporting beliefs or reliability; in the case of knowledge, practical rationality and theoretical rationality are intertwined.

    Stanley defends this thesis against alternative accounts of the phenomena that motivate it, such as the claim that knowledge attributions are linguistically context-sensitive contextualism about knowledge attributions , and the claim that the truth of a knowledge claim is somehow relative to the person making the claim relativism about knowledge. Unger, Philosophical Relativity , in the Journal of Philosoph y 83 : PI — Does the content of a knowledge- attributing sentence depend only upon features of the context of utterance?

    However, since this shorter version was in JP, it is now on JSTOR, and so may be more accessible to some readers than the more complete paper in Synthese. McLaughlin, ed. Greco and E. Sosa, ed. This paper explains epistemic contextualism, its precursors and history, its relation to other views in epistemology, and its importance to the problem of skepticism.

    Contextualism is then defended from what is perhaps the most important objection it faces: that the contextualist has mistaken taken variability in the conditions of warranted assertability of knowledge attributions for a variability in their truth-conditions.

    Samenvatting

    V, Epistemology: I show that contextualism would have us say no such thing. Greco, ed. PI — Contextualism about knowledge attributions, as proposed by Steward Cohen, Keith DeRose, and David Lewis, replies to skepticism by contending that knowledge attributions are context sensitive. It asserts that we do satisfy the low standards in place in ordinary contexts but not the higher standards applicable when skepticism is being discussed. I argue that contextualism does not provide a satisfactory response to skepticism because it provides no good response to the central claim defended by skeptics, namely that we do not satisfy the ordinary low standards for knowledge.

    PI — This paper is an exploration of the relevant alternatives approach to knowledge RA and its relationship to skepticism and closure. RA holds that to know p S must be able to rule out all relevant alternatives to p. The simple view is that RA avoids skepticism by rejecting closure: S can be justified in believing p without being justified in believing that there is no evil genius deceiving her about p, different worlds being relevant for the different propositions.

    This simple view has come under persuasive attack. A more detailed understanding of RA avoids the objections to the simple view. It is contextualism that answers the skeptical challenge but the pure relevant alternatives theory, separate from the contextualist component, that solves the Gettier problem.

    The paper also explores some details of context sensitivity, distinguishing different kinds of contributions from different elements of the context. Korta, E. Sosa, X. Arrazola, ed. Contextualism is then defended from what is perhaps the most important objection it faces: that the contextualist has mistaken taken variability in the conditions of warranted assertability of knowledge attributions for a variability in their truth-conditions.

    V, Epistemology: I show that contextualism would have us say no such thing. Greco, ed.

    The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism

    PI — Contextualism about knowledge attributions, as proposed by Steward Cohen, Keith DeRose, and David Lewis, replies to skepticism by contending that knowledge attributions are context sensitive. It asserts that we do satisfy the low standards in place in ordinary contexts but not the higher standards applicable when skepticism is being discussed.

    I argue that contextualism does not provide a satisfactory response to skepticism because it provides no good response to the central claim defended by skeptics, namely that we do not satisfy the ordinary low standards for knowledge. PI — This paper is an exploration of the relevant alternatives approach to knowledge RA and its relationship to skepticism and closure.

    RA holds that to know p S must be able to rule out all relevant alternatives to p. The simple view is that RA avoids skepticism by rejecting closure: S can be justified in believing p without being justified in believing that there is no evil genius deceiving her about p, different worlds being relevant for the different propositions. This simple view has come under persuasive attack.

    A more detailed understanding of RA avoids the objections to the simple view. It is contextualism that answers the skeptical challenge but the pure relevant alternatives theory, separate from the contextualist component, that solves the Gettier problem. The paper also explores some details of context sensitivity, distinguishing different kinds of contributions from different elements of the context. Korta, E. Sosa, X. Arrazola, ed. Several recent contextualist theorists e. Their claim is that one should view satisfactory answers to global doubts regarding such subjects as the external world, other minds, and induction as requirements for justification in certain philosophical contexts, but not in everyday and scientific contexts.

    In contrast, the skeptic claims that a satisfactory answer to a global doubt in each of these areas is a context-invariant requirement for justified belief.


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    To this end, I clarify the general strategy, distinguish it from a variety of others, and discuss its prospects as an answer to the skeptic. Does Jones know p or not? I develop a Dretske-inspired contextualism which addresses both matters. I argue that it has great strength relative to numerous epistemological problems, but lacks antiskeptical import, and suggest that it is unlikely that any contextualist view will have such import.

    Along the way, I defend radical skepticism against numerous objections and misconceptions. PI — Keith DeRose has defended a version of contextualism according to which the claim made by the skeptic, properly understood, is both true and compatible with the claim made by the antiskeptic.

    Second, that insofar as he does concede this much to contextualism, then he jeopardizes his original defense of the argument for nonclosure and with it his version of the relevant alternatives theory. PI — Perhaps the most dominant antiskeptical proposal in recent literature—advanced by such figures as Stewart Cohen, Keith DeRose and David Lewis—is the contextualist response to radical skepticism. Central to the contextualist thesis is the claim that, unlike other noncontextualist antiskeptical theories, contextualism offers a dissolution of the skeptical paradox that respects our common sense epistemological intuitions.

    This article surveys work in epistemology since the mids.

    Epistemic Contextualism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

    PI — Most contextualist solutions to the puzzle of skepticism have the drawback of requiring special context-dependent rules for knowledge ascriptions. Since the only justification for such rules is that they solve the puzzle, these solutions are ad hoc. I develop a contextualist theory that dispenses with special rules.