Build alliances to preserve global governance. No international actor is better positioned than the EU to lead the struggle for a rules-based international order. This will require strong investment in the partnerships with other stakeholders. Mobilize expertise. The EU delegations, the civil and military operations, and the EU headquarters in Brussels possess vast amounts of geographic and topical know-how that is currently dispersed and underutilized.
With its emphasis on soft power, preference for legal solutions, and enthusiasm for multilateral diplomacy, the EU has had trouble adjusting to a multipolar world increasingly ruled by power politics. The basic rules of decisionmaking processes are the most serious constraint. The member states decide on common foreign and security policy by unanimity and run their own national policy in parallel. These limitations compound the inherent problems of collective action by a large group of states, such as the diversity of interests, insufficient solidarity, free riding, and fragmented and weak leadership.
Increasing the overall level of activity, bringing the member states more fully on board, building alliances to defend global governance, and mobilizing the expertise present in the institutions can help build the confidence and ambition necessary for effective international engagement. This sense of achievement and optimism also framed its view of its place in the world.
The EU considered itself the vanguard of an emerging liberal international order, in which multilateral diplomacy would create elaborate rules-based regimes regulating all dimensions of globalized exchanges and cooperation.
Is There Hope for EU Foreign Policy?
As a system of transnational cooperation with a strong legal foundation, the EU saw itself as a model for the future organization of international relations and was convinced that other parts of the world would soon follow suit. The treaty was rejected by referendums in France and the Netherlands, but its foreign policy provisions reappeared—largely unchanged—in the Lisbon Treaty, which was signed in December The Lisbon reforms did not amount to a revolution.
The high representative was meant to be the lynchpin of the new system. The new European External Action Service EEAS would include diplomats from the member states and officials from the institutions and serve as a coordination platform and a source of expertise and strategic advice. The implementation of these reforms began in in a quite different political environment. In retrospect, it was probably also suboptimal to locate the institutional center of EU foreign policy on the level of foreign ministers.
Over previous decades, foreign ministers have lost ground in Europe just like in other parts of the world. The real players in this area are today the prime ministers and presidents. Effective EU foreign policy requires their direct involvement. The high representative is simply not quite high enough to engage with U. Therefore, the entire EU foreign policy apparatus remains somewhat detached from the real decisionmaking level. Still, over the years, some functional advantages of the new setup have emerged. The gulf between classical foreign policy and commission-led trade and aid policies has been reduced.
In crisis management, but also when policy papers are worked out in the EU institutions, officials responsible for security and diplomacy are now joined by those responsible for trade, development, and humanitarian affairs. This allows various policy instruments to be more coordinated. EU delegations in third countries now deal with political matters alongside trade and aid. Again, this enhanced policy coherence has given the EU a more visible presence in many parts of the world.
NATO matters, but the EU matters more
In the East, an assertive Russia drew the EU into a geopolitical competition for the first time. A low-level conflict continues in Ukraine, and the EU members bordering Russia feel exposed to pressure from Moscow. Turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa has thrown up a number of critical challenges, such as mass migration and terrorism, and there appear to be few prospects of the region returning to stability. All these changes do not just represent temporary setbacks, they reflect a shift in paradigm. A multipolar world has emerged where authoritarian regimes rule in many countries and power politics have made a comeback.
One might have expected that the deteriorating overall security situation would have prompted EU actors to pull together and mobilize resources for determined collective action. However, very little along these lines has happened. In a business-as-usual mode, it continued to conduct political dialogues with third countries and churn out declarations. Diplomatic initiatives to resolve the various regional crises remained rare and internal divisions have deepened rather than diminished.
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When the high representative advocated a more active approach, she often ran into opposition from member states. The darkening security environment has necessitated a review of the overly optimistic transformational goals of earlier policies, and a focus on threats and interests. The original idea of the European Neighborhood Policy—that the EU would transform its neighbors into democratic market economies committed to the rule of law and eventually allow them to share in the benefits of European integration—has never been underpinned by sufficient commitment.
Now, this objective has been quietly reduced to a few already advanced countries such as Georgia, Ukraine, and Tunisia. This adjustment was certainly justified. The revised neighborhood policy of therefore names stability as the greatest overarching objective. The dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, EU involvement in the negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program, the fight against piracy around the Horn of Africa, and the efforts to shore up governance in Mali and neighboring states have contributed to enhancing stability in the neighborhood.
The EU-Turkey deal on refugees—while much criticized at the time by humanitarian NGOs—also showed the ability to manage a complex and urgent challenge. Concerning Russia, the EU managed to maintain unity in its sanctions policy—a considerable achievement given the diverse attitude of member states toward Moscow.
But the price of this unity was diplomatic paralysis. Just two EU member states, Germany and France, participated in the Normandy format negotiations on the Ukrainian conflict, but they were unable to overcome the stalemate. The EU institutions were practically locked out of this area, as illustrated by the fact that Federica Mogherini visited Moscow for the first time one-and-a-half years after she assumed office. Regarding Syria, the greatest tragedy of recent years with vast consequences for Europe, the EU from the beginning failed to match the objectives of its policy with appropriate instruments.
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While EU actors, particularly France and the UK, were pushing for the intervention that would bring down Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi, the EU proved ineffective in tackling the postrevolutionary chaos. Instead, stopping the migrants who crossed from Libya to Italy soon became the primary objective. Italy is taking the lead on the ground and working closely with various Libyan security actors. The picture is not much more encouraging on the global level. The EU certainly continues to be one of the most important players in multilateral diplomacy, with its contribution to the Paris Agreement on climate change amounting to the biggest success in recent years.
After decades of increasing international weight through successive enlargements, the EU will now lose 16 percent of its economy and one of its strongest foreign policy players. The EU has also failed to develop a coherent response to the rise of China. Competing interests of member states have allowed Beijing to play various parts of the EU off each other. However, neither can yet be considered a game changer.
The strategy, however, also has shortcomings. While the text has been coordinated with national officials, member state buy-in has remained rather limited. It is doubtful whether the leaders of the bigger member states—the real decisionmakers on EU foreign policy today—will derive much guidance from the document. The priorities of their national foreign policies are likely to prevail. Because of its timing, the document also could not take into account two crucial events for EU foreign policy: Brexit and the election of Donald Trump.
Arguably, the most acute strategic challenge for the EU will be adjusting to these developments. While the document is quite new, parts of it already look somewhat dated. In the area of security and defense policy, the Lisbon Treaty had brought only limited innovations, and these areas have stagnated following its introduction. However, Russian hostility and rearmament, instability in the South, and the loss of confidence in U. Recent initiatives regarding coordinated defense planning and enhanced defense cooperation, joint financing of EU military operations, and allowing groups of the more capable member states to cooperate on more ambitious defense projects seem to indicate an understanding that the EU needs to upgrade its security and defense capacity.
Together with the new readiness of the commission to provide funding for common efforts on capacity development, this could create a promising environment for significant progress. Even under favorable circumstances, the current initiatives for building up military capacities will take several years, in some cases decades, to bear fruit.
However, in view of past experience, rich with false starts and unfulfilled promises, it appears prudent to remain cautious. The key question will be to what extent member states will back up the various declaratory commitments with concrete implementing steps.
Many of them still seem torn between the objective need for cooperation and the desire to maintain maximum autonomy. Political divisions over migration and eurozone management diminish the mutual confidence necessary for effective defense cooperation. And then there is the major problem of managing the gap in expectations.
Military technology is spreading rapidly to state and nonstate actors, and a number of powers in neighboring regions are building up their military strength. The EU began work on its foreign policy in the early s. The Common Foreign and Security Policy was created in the early s, but it remains half-finished and fragile to this date. Other important initiatives of European integration, such as the internal market, monetary union, and Schengen area, have moved forward with greater speed and have advanced much further.
This relative lack of dynamism in foreign policy cannot be explained by the absence of public support. As the executive body, the commission is most responsible for the day-to-day operations of the EU. The commission is tasked with drafting legislation and drawing up the EU budget.
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It sends these proposals to Parliament and the Council of Ministers and negotiates with them until it wins approval from both institutions. The commission also helps enforce EU treaties by raising legal disputes with the Court of Justice. Member states gave the EU different levels of authority over different areas, known as competencies :. But CFSP decisions must be unanimous, and member states remain free to make their own foreign policies. Implementation of the CFSP, the responsibility of the European Commission, is carried out by the high representative of the union for foreign affairs and security policy, a position informally known as the EU foreign minister.
This position was created by the Lisbon Treaty to strengthen and centralize EU diplomacy. It is managed by the commission, draws staff from across the EU institutions, and operates in more than countries. The bloc played a leading role in negotiating international agreements including the Paris climate accord and the Iranian nuclear deal , both finalized in In major conflict zones, such as Libya, Syria, and Ukraine, the bloc has struggled to define a common policy.
It has maintained sanctions on Russia since the annexation of Crimea, but EU members are divided over how closely to work with Moscow on energy and other areas. National governments have agreed to transfer all their decision-making power in this area, unlike other foreign policy matters, to the EU. The EU needs a unified trade policy because of its customs union, which sets a single external tariff for the entire bloc, and its single market, which treats all goods and services that enter the EU the same.
Finally, if a trade deal is particularly broad, it may also require the individual approval of each EU member state. Signed in , CETA has yet to take full effect because the Italian government has so far refused to sign off on it. EU countries cooperate on military missions, but they are conducted on a voluntary, case-by-case basis by national militaries. EU security efforts take place under the common security and defense policy CSDP , which is also operated out of the European Commission and led by the EU foreign minister.
The CSDP involves both military and civilian work, ranging from police training programs to peacekeeping, anti-piracy, and rescue missions. In practice, many, including U. The EU budget, while renegotiated by the European Commission, Parliament, and the Council of Ministers yearly, must fit previously agreed budget frameworks that set a cap on total spending, generally over a seven-year time span.
The current framework covers — The EU budget must balance, since the bloc has no authority to spend more than it takes in. Almost all of its revenue comes from member states, which contribute varying amounts based on their economic heft.
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Yet, the prospect of an implosion of the European Union should be as unbearable and intolerable to an American audience as the dissolution of NATO—or more so, as no one wants to see the demons of nationalism back on the European continent, along with a global economic catastrophe. Benign neglect is counterproductive; but a policy openly hostile to the European Union is a grave mistake.
In a world where the strongmen are striking back , Americans should not forget that the European Union stands with the United States when it matters most. The NATO summit in Washington this week should be the occasion to recall not only the utmost importance of the Atlantic alliance to trans-Atlantic security, but also the crucial contribution of the European Union to peace, unity, and ultimately security for Europe and beyond. Order from Chaos. A how-to guide for managing the end of the post-Cold War era. Play Audio. Related Books. Order from Chaos A how-to guide for managing the end of the post-Cold War era.
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