Thesis: Shakespeare plays puppet master with the character Macbeth by dangling his fate in front of him, but at the same time it is Macbeth's own desire and intellectual views that lead him into mental illness and finally to It would be impossible to translate their discussions into language that did not involve those words. Economics Essays : Essay on Free Trade.
Free Will versus the Programmed Brain
Essay on Free Will Free Will The world is full of constraints and it is challenging to manage freedom due to the fact that people, seeking for their rights and making decisions, tend to forget about and set constraints to the free will of others. Essay Free Will Versus Determinism The controversy between free will and determinism has been argued about for years. What is the difference between the two? Looking in a dictionary, free will is the power, attributed to human beings, of making free choices that are unconstrained by external circumstances or by an agency such as fate or divine will.
Fate vs free will essays The question of whether our lives are controlled by fate or free will has and will always be around, because we will never have evidence that either is right or wrong. Some have become convinced that the future is already determined, and nothing we do will change its Reviewed by Manuel R. Vargas, University of San Francisco Shaun Nichols offers a provocative and original approach to the problem of free will. Drawing from Arguments supporting free will as a necessary, beneficial reality include: Freedom of choice. The idea that a free agent "could have done otherwise" is a key element in the libertarian argument.
It is seen as a condition for moral responsibility, although freedom in this sense is prior to moral issues. In recent philosophical jargon, it is known as PAP the " principle of alternative possibilities. PAP is under attack by many compatibilists and determinists. It has been twisted by compatibilists into sophisticated logical arguments and "thought experiments" that purport to prove that the ability to do otherwise under identical conditions is impossible.
If such a capability did exist it could only be arbitrary indeed , capricious yes , and irrational. And to this day has led even some libertarian thinkers to doubt that an "intelligible" account can be given of free choice. We will look at some of the arguments, then explain how randomly generated alternative possibilities are all we need to provide the opportunity to do otherwise - and thus be both unpredictable and responsible.
Robert Kane pointed out Free Will and Values , p. For Thomas Hobbes , the first modern compatibilist, the idea of a free agent that could do otherwise was a contradiction and nonsense. John Bramhall sees no contradiction. For a in these words, 'all things needful' or 'all things requisite', the actual determination of the will is not included. But by 'all things needful or requisite', all necessary power either operative or elective, all necessary instruments and adjuments extrinsical and intrinsical, and all conditions, are intended. As he that has pen and ink and paper, a table, a desk, and leisure, the art of writing, and the free use of his hand, has all things requisite to write if he will; and yet he may forbear if he will But now when science and conscience, reason and religion, our own and other men's experience, do teach us that the will has a dominion over its own acts, to will or nill without extrinsical necessitation, if the power to will be present in actu primo [as a first actuality], determinable by ourselves, then there is no necessary power wanting in this respect to the producing of the effect.
David Hume 's compatibilist account of liberty and necessity is similar to Hobbes. Freedom to do otherwise was "unintelligible," a word still very popular with modern compatiblists and even some anxious libertarians.
Free Will, Love, And Anger
First, After we have perform'd any action; tho' we confess we were influenc'd by particular views and motives; 'tis difficult for us to persuade ourselves we were govern'd by necessity, and that 'twas utterly impossible for us to have acted otherwise; the idea of necessity seeming to imply something of force, and violence, and constraint, of which we are not sensible.
Few are capable of distinguishing betwixt the liberty of spontaneity, as it is call'd in the schools, and the liberty of indifference; betwixt that which is oppos'd to violence, and that which means a negation of necessity and causes. Moore argued in in his Ethics that one could do otherwise, but only if one had chosen to do otherwise. Many later philosophers found this idea to be empty, since under determinism one could not have so chosen. It only asserts, that, in the case of all voluntary actions, he could have acted differently, if he had chosen: not that he could have made the choice.
It does not assert, therefore, that right and wrong depend upon what he could choose.
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As to this, it makes no assertion at all: it neither affirms nor denies that they do so depend. It only asserts that they do depend upon what he could have done or could do, if he chose. In every case of voluntary action, a man could, if he had so chosen just before, have done at least one other action instead. That was the definition of a voluntary action : and it seems quite certain that many actions are voluntary in this sense. Hobart Dickinson S. Miller claimed in that free will involved determination and was inconceivable without it.
I mean it as implying responsibility, merit and demerit, guilt and desert. I mean it as implying, after an act has been performed, that one "could have done otherwise" than one did. That we are free in willing is, broadly speaking, a fact of experience. That broad fact is more assured than any philosophical analysis.
It is therefore surer than the deterministic analysis of it, entirely adequate as that in the end appears to be.
But it is not here affirmed that there are no small exceptions, no slight undetermined swervings, no ingredient of absolute chance. All that is here said is that such absence of determination, if and so far as it exists, is no gain to freedom, but sheer loss of it; no advantage to the moral life, but blank subtraction from it. Thus it is true, after the act of will, that I could have willed otherwise.
It is most natural to add, "if I had wanted to"; but the addition is not required. The point is the meaning of "could". I could have willed whichever way I pleased. I had the power to will otherwise, there was nothing to prevent my doing so, and I should have done so if I had wanted. If someone says that the wish I actually had prevented my willing otherwise, so that I could not have done it, he is merely making a slip in the use of the word "could".
Moritz Schlick reiterated Moore's view, and included the idea of " exactly the same circumstances " in chapter VII of his book Problems in Ethics. Schlick introduced the terminology of a pseudo-problem into the debate in this chapter entitled When Is A Man Responsible? The absence of the external power expresses itself in the well-known feeling usually considered characteristic of the consciousness of freedom that one could also have acted otherwise.
How this indubitable experience ever came to be an argument in favor of indeterminism is incomprehensible to me. It is of course obvious that I should have acted differently had I willed something else; but the feeling never says that I could also have willed something else, even though this is true, if, that is, other motives had been present. And it says even less that under exactly the same inner and outer conditions I could also have willed something else. Nowell Smith , in Mind , , provided a lengthy analysis of "could have done otherwise" in his article Free Will and Moral Responsibility.
The Argument Of Free Will And Determinism Philosophy Essay
The problem arises out of a prima facie incompatibility between the freedom of human action and the universality of causal law. It was raised in an acute form when universal determinism was believed to be a necessary presupposition of science; but it was not then new, because the incompatibility, if it exists at all, exists equally between human freedom and the foreknowledge of God. As it appears to the 'plain man ' the problem may be formulated as follows: "Very often I seem to myself to be acting freely, and this freedom, if it exists, implies that I could have acted otherwise than I did.
If this freedom is illusory, I shall need a very convincing argument to prove that it is so, since it appears to be something of which I am immediately aware. Moreover, if there is no freedom, there is no moral responsibility; for it would not be right to praise or blame a man for something that he could not help doing. But, if a man could have acted otherwise than he did, his action must have been uncaused, and universal determinism is therefore untrue.
His case may be stated as follows: " It is a well-known maxim that 'I ought' implies 'I can'. If I cannot do a certain action, then that action cannot be my duty. On the other hand, 'I ought' as clearly implies 'I need not'; for if I cannot possibly refrain from a certain action, there can be no merit or demerit in doing it. Therefore, in every case of moral choice it is possible for the agent to do the action and also possible for him not to do it; were it not so, there would be no choice; for choice is between possibilities.
But this implies that the action is uncaused, because a caused action cannot but occur. But in fact we never do mean this; and if we believe that voluntary action is uncaused action that is only because we believe erroneously that uncaused action is a necessary condition of moral responsibility.
The Libertarian believes that an action cannot be a moral one if the agent could not have acted otherwise, and he takes no account of possible differences in the causes that might have prevented him from acting otherwise. The Determinist, on the other hand, holds that the objective possibility of alternative actions is an illusion and that, if A in fact did X, then he could not have done any action incompatible with X. If we proceed on the assumption that, to be moral, an action must be uncaused, either we shall find a genuinely uncaused action at the beginning of the chain or we shall not.
If we do not, then, according to the Libertarian, there can be no moral praise and blame at all and it was to account for these that Libertarianism was invented ; and, if we do, then we must suppose that, while almost all our actions are caused, and therefore amoral, there was in the distant past some one action that was not caused and for which we can justly be praised or blamed. This bizarre theory has in fact been held; but the objections to it are clear.
It seems to me that many philosophers and I suspect that Moritz Schlick is among them begin their enquiry with so firm a conviction that the contra-causal sort of freedom nowhere exists, that they find it hard to take very seriously the possibility that it is this sort of freedom that moral responsibility implies. For they are loth to abandon the commonsense belief that moral responsibility itself is something real. The implicit reasoning I take to be this. Moral responsibility is real.
If moral responsibility is real, the freedom implied in it must be a fact. But contra-causal freedom is not a fact. Therefore contra-causal freedom is not the freedom implied in moral responsibility. I think we should be on our guard against allowing this or some similar train of reasoning whose premises, after all, are far from indubitable to seduce us into distorting what we actually find when we set about a direct analysis of moral responsibility and its conditions. Let us put the argument implicit in the common view a little more sharply. The moral 'ought' implies 'can'.
If we say that A morally ought to have done X, we imply that in our opinion, he could have done X. But we assign moral blame to a man only for failing to do what we think he morally ought to have done. Hence if we morally blame A for not having done X, we imply that he could have done X even though in fact he did not. In other words, we imply that A could have acted otherwise than he did. And that means that we imply, as a necessary condition of a man's being morally blameworthy, that he enjoyed a freedom of a kind not compatible with unbroken causal continuity.
In the course of a recent article in Mind, entitled 'Free Will and Moral Responsibility', Mr Nowell Smith having earlier affirmed his belief that 'the traditional problem has been solved' explains very concisely the nature of the confusion which, as he thinks, has led to the demand for a contra-causal freedom. He begins by frankly recognizing that 'It is evident that one of the necessary conditions of moral action is that the agent "could have acted otherwise" ' and he adds 'it is to this fact that the Libertarian is drawing attention'.
But in fact we never do mean this. Mr Nowell Smith does not tell us in so many words, but the passage I have quoted leaves little doubt how he would answer. What we really mean by the expression, he implies, is not a categorical but a hypothetical proposition. We mean 'A could have acted otherwise, if he did not happen to be what he in fact was, or if he were placed in circumstances other than those in which he was in fact placed'.
Now, these propositions, it is easy to see, are in no way incompatible with acceptance of the causal principle in its full rigour. Accordingly the claim that our fundamental moral thinking obliges us to assert a contra-causal freedom as a condition of moral responsibility is disproved. Nowell Smith published one more criticism of Campbell in his book Ethics in Campbell takes as a typical and, by implication, the only case of moral choice to which appraisals are relevant, that of a man who knows what he ought to do but is tempted to do something else.
Now this, so far from being the only case, is not even the commonest or most important. For in the great majority of cases of moral difficulty what is difficult is not to decide to do what one knows he ought to do, but to decide what one ought to do. Perhaps the most crucial objection to the libertarian thesis lies in the sharp discontinuity which it presupposes between moral and non-moral choice and between moral and non-moral appraisal. It is not enough to admit that we can, within broad limits, predict what a man of known habits, tastes, and interests will do and to insist that our powers of prediction only break down in the small, but important area of moral choice For the rigid distinction between 'formed character' where determinism reigns and 'creative choice' which is in principle unpredictable it would be better to substitute a conception of continual modification of character in both its moral and its non-moral aspects.
Ayer 's essay Freedom and Necessity published in his Philosophical Essays made it clear what determinism or compatibilism requires "When I am said to have done something of my own free will it is implied that I could have acted otherwise; and it is only when it is believed that I could have acted otherwise that I am held to be morally responsible for what I have done. For a man is not thought to be morally responsible for an action that it was not in his power to avoid.
But if human behaviour is entirely governed by causal laws, it is not clear how any action that is done could ever have been avoided. It may be said of the agent that he would have acted otherwise if the causes of his action had been different, but they being what they were, it seems to follow that he was bound to act as he did. Now it is commonly assumed both that men are capable of acting freely, in the sense that is required to make them morally responsible, and that human behaviour is entirely governed by causal laws: and it is the apparent conflict between these two assumptions that gives rise to the philosophical problem of the freedom of the will.
When they are fulfilled, I may be said to have acted freely. But this is not to say that it was a matter of chance that I acted as I did, or, in other words, that my action could not be explained. And that my actions should be capable of being explained is all that is required by the postulate of determinism. All this talk about "could" and "if" led the ordinary language philosopher J.
Austin to look closely at what these terms mean in his famous article " Ifs and Cans ".